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Introduction
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe opened the way towards Post-Marxism with 
the publication of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Demo-
cratic Politics in 1985. With his theoretical development, Ernesto Laclau has 
become one of the most outstanding theorists regarding the relation between 
political thinking and psychoanalysis, especially Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
This work is aimed at analyzing such relation. Theoretical tools of psychoanaly-
sis are used to locate the implicit postulates in Laclau’s work. However, it is 
worth clarifying that it is not the objective of this work to search for the main 
elements of Lacanian theory in Laclau’s work; i.e. the following questions are 
not intended to be answered: Where is the object a in Laclau’s theory? Where is 
the master-signifier located? Where is the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real? 
It is not possible to establish a point to point correspondence between the two 
theories. From our perspective, this comparison would be senseless because 
they are two different theoretical stances, and do not require further explana-
tion if tackled from linguistics:  each element acquires signification with regard 
to the relation it establishes with the other elements within a given structure. 
Therefore, as they are two different works, it is impossible to institute a point 
to point relation. Moreover, the characteristics of Lacan’s work differ from La-
clau’s, becoming impossible to compare. For example, in Lacan’s work, several 
theories are included but they do not constitute a system, and they can only be 
understood regarding the specific problem where they emerged. But in Laclau’s 
work, a certain intention of systematicity can be seen.     
The present work is aimed at reading Laclau from a psychoanalytical viewpoint 
in order to locate the underlying postulates. Three fundamental aspects may be 
distinguished in Laclau’s theory: antagonism, dislocation, and heterogeneity. 
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Antagonism 
With Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics in 
1985, Laclau and Mouffe began a prolific theoretical production that was soon 
called Post-Marxism. In that book, after reviewing and deconstructing Marxism, 
the authors provide the conceptual keys to escape from essentialism, i.e. the no-
tions of antagonism and hegemony.   
In order to build their theory, Laclau and Mouffe propose as an ontological prin-
ciple the understanding of the social as a discursive space. Therefore, the idea 
of social structuration responds to a rhetorical model. Their idea of discourse 
not only refers to linguistic elements (the oral or written word) but to any rela-
tion of signification. “Synonymy, metonymy, metaphor are not forms of thought 
that add a second sense to the primary, constitutive literality of social relations; 
instead they are part of the primary terrain itself in which the social is consti-
tuted.” (Laclau/Mouffe, 1985: 110). Thus, they postulate that the discursive field 
superimposes the field of social relations which are considered as such because 
they have and produce meaning.   
Laclau and Mouffe define discourse as a “structured totality resulting from the 
articulatory practice”. This definition leans towards Foucault’s idea of discursive 
formation as regularity in dispersion. But, by rejecting the distinction between 
discursive and non-discursive practices, Laclau and Mouffe distance themselves 
from it. Also, while they followDerrida in order to generalize the concept of 
discourse by saying that “the absence of transcendental signified extends the 
domain and the play of signification infinitely”, they distance themselves from 
him when they turn to psychoanalysis. This distancing was later reaffirmed by 
Laclau when he elaborated the concept of heterogeneity, which, from our per-
spective, may be compared to the Lacanian surplus-jouissance (this idea will be 
analysed in detail at the end of this article).  
Therefore, if everything is the play of differences, we are located in the domain 
of radical contingency where every identity is relational because each element 
is what the other is not. But this infinite play requires a certain fixation so that 
meaning may be produced. If we remain within a constant displacement of ele-
ments, we would face such a dispersion of meaning that signification would be 
impossible – like psychotic thinking. Thus, Laclau and Mouffe introduce Lacan’s 
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concept of point de capiton or nodal point, which, in their own terminology, is 
called the empty signifier, i.e. the signifier or particular element that assumes 
the structurally ‘universal’ function within a discursive field. That element al-
lows a certain suture or fixation – always partial – of the play of signification so 
that the signifier chain can acquire some meaning. The concept of articulation 
is understood as: “a practice instituting the nodal points which partially fix the 
meaning” (Laclau/Mouffe, 1985: 113). 
A nodal point makes possible this fixation of the signifier’s displacement – al-
though always precariously. And this partial fixation takes place because the 
nodal point is so only if it is overdetermined. Laclau and Mouffe took the con-
cept of overdetermination from Althusser, borrowed while modifying it accord-
ing to Freud’s early works. In fact, Althusser postulated that there is nothing 
within the social that is not overdetermined as a way of expressing that the so-
cial order is consistent with the symbolic order. Therefore, it lacks a founding 
principle. However, he reintroduces a renewed form of essentialism by affirming 
the existence of an overdetermination by the economy in the last instance. The 
latter idea is unacceptable for Laclau and Mouffe because it would mean go-
ing back to the binary pair essence-accident, but in a Marxist format: material 
base-superstructure, where the relations of production (which are located in 
the material base) have the final word. Furthermore, it erases all the complexity 
involved in the overdetermination: “If the economy is an object which can de-
termine any type of society in that instance [tha last instance], this means that, 
at least with reference to that instance, we are faced with simple determination 
and not overdetermination. If society has a last instance which determines its 
laws of motion, the relations between the overdetermined instances and the last 
instance must be conceived in terms of simple, one-directional determination by 
the latter” (Laclau/Mouffe, 1985: 99). 
Crucial here is Lacan’s returning to Freud, more specifically, to Freud’s concept 
of overdetermination in his famous text The Interpretation of Dreams (1900). 
There, he inverts the binary opposition waking state-dream in which Descartes 
had established the supremacy of the waking state and dismissed the dream as 
a waste. Freud proposes a hermeneutics without an ultimate foundation from 
a two-level topology: the manifest content (the text that the dreamer remem-
bers when he wakes up, characterized by being meagre, paltry, and laconic) and 
the latent content (the dream-thoughts, characterized by being copious, varied, 
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and extensive). The dream work consists in transferring the latent contents to 
the manifest contents, that is, the transference of elements from one text to the 
other (from the text of the dream to the conscious text). But, what is at work 
there such that a copious, varied, and extensive text turns into a meagre, paltry, 
and laconic one? The dream work, says Freud, the unconscious translates one 
text into another through the mechanisms of condensation and displacement. 
But this does not mean, strictly speaking, that something is lost during that 
translation operated by the unconscious. That could only be deemed so if we 
consider a point to point translation. But what Freud shows is that the uncon-
scious works in a different way, such that several elements remain condensed 
and others are displaced. “The fact that is at issue in this explanation can be 
expressed differently by saying: each element of the dream content (that is, the 
text we remember) appears as overdetermined, being the substitute of multiple 
dream-thoughts” (Freud, 1900: 291). But what do Laclau and Mouffe take from 
Freud’s ideas? Mainly the existence of another logic which is not controlled by 
the principle of non-contradiction, that is, the logic of articulation. The nodal 
points – which refer to articulation – are the elements where the largest amount 
of associative chains converges. In other words, they are the overdetermined 
elements, that is, the elements that condense the highest amount of dream con-
tent by mere association. Therefore, the empty signifiers are overdetermined el-
ements because they condense elements from different associative chains, and 
anchor, always precariously, certain meaning. 
With respect to the concept of hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe introduce the con-
cept of overdetermination in order to analyze identity, totality, and hegemony. 
A hegemonic articulation takes place when a particular element assumes at a 
certain moment the representation of a totality which is entirely incommensu-
rable with regard to itself. This element assumes such representation because 
it was overdetermined when condensing the highest amount of associative 
chains. Thus, not only a certain fixation of meaning is obtained, but also a cer-
tain idea of totality can be accessed through the mediation of such particularity 
which assumes the representation of universality. That is, the hegemonic ar-
ticulations suppose suturing effects. A hegemonic relation articulates the differ-
ences through an element (which has become a nodal point or empty signifier, 
etc.) that assumes the representation of the totality. Furthermore, it embodies 
a certain configuration which is no more than a sutured order, since the suture 
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indicates the impossibility of the fixation of an order as a coherently unified 
totality. 
The field of differences or divisions in constant movement will always be exces-
sive without the possibility of the fixation of an order as a coherently unified 
totality. That is, the order would never embrace the totality of differences or di-
visions. Thus, the openness of the social is constitutive because such excess of 
the social prevents the closure of the order as a unified or full totality. The social 
as such cannot be more than a failed attempt to ‘domesticate’ the field of dif-
ferences. A hegemonic articulation is the only possibility to create a precarious 
order where there is not one. This explains the famous phrase: “The social is 
articulation insofar as ‘society’ is impossible” (Laclau/Mouffe, 1985: 114).   
This concept of hegemony is closely related to the concept of antagonism. First-
ly, Laclau and Mouffe define antagonism as the “limit of all objectivity” (Laclau/
Mouffe, 1985: 122). That is, antagonism, far from being an objective relation, 
shows the limits of objectivity. It is the experience of the limit of order. The pos-
sibility of a hegemonic construction exists precisely because of the existence of 
antagonism. Without antagonism, ‘society’ would be possible as a unity with-
out fissures, a coherently unified totality constituted by full identities. Then, the 
possibility of ‘the social’ as a hegemonic relation would simply be eliminated. 
“Antagonism, far from being an objective relation, is a relation wherein the limits 
of every objectivity are shown – in the sense in which Wittgenstein used to say 
that ‘what cannot be said can be shown’. But if, as we have demonstrated, the 
social only exists as a partial effort for constructing society – that is, an objective 
and closed system of differences – antagonism, as a witness of the impossibility 
of a final suture, is the ‘experience’ of the limit of the social. Strictly speaking, 
antagonisms are not internal but external to society; or rather, they constitute 
the limits of society, the latter's impossibility of fully constituting itself” (La-
clau/Mouffe, 1985: 122). It is well known that this definition of antagonism was 
highly appreciated at that time by Žižek (1990), who stated: “It is not an acci-
dent that the basic proposition of Hegemony – ‘society does not exist’ – evokes 
the Lacanian postulate ‘la Femme n’existe pas’ (Woman does not exist). The real 
achievement of hegemony is crystallized in the concept of social antagonism: 
far from reducing all reality to a kind of language-game, the socio-symbolic field 
is conceived as structured around a certain traumatic impossibility, around a 
certain fissure that cannot be symbolized. In short, Laclau and Mouffe have, so 
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to speak, reinvented the Lacanian notion of the Real as impossible; they have 
made it useful as a tool for social and ideological analysis” (Žižek, 1990: 249). 
What Žižek is saying, and we agree, is that Laclau and Mouffe’s great achieve-
ment was to conceive the idea of antagonism as the limit of all objectivity, that 
is, the reformulation of Lacan’s idea of the real as impossible. In other words, 
the antagonism is conceived as a traumatic kernel around which the order is 
structured (the socio-symbolic field), i.e. the social. 
It was also Žižek who highlighted a second definition of antagonism given by 
Laclau and Mouffe: “But in the case of antagonism, we are confronted with a 
different situation: the presence of the ‘Other’ prevents me from being totally 
myself. The relation arises not from full totalities, but from the impossibility of 
their constitution” (Laclau/Mouffe, 1985: 122). Žižek points out a problem here 
because this definition of antagonism is tied to the idea of the subject that Laclau 
and Mouffe took from Foucault. And Foucault’s notion of subject-positions has 
as a hidden implication which is, at some point, the illusion of fullness. Žižek 
claims, then, that with such Foucauldian argument, Laclau and Mouffe intend 
to attack “the notion of the subject as a substantial, essential entity, given in ad-
vance, dominating the social process and not being produced by the contingen-
cy of the discursive process itself; against this notion, they claim that what we 
have is a series of particular subject-positions (feminist, ecologist, democratic, 
etc.) the signification of which is not fixed in advance: it changes according to 
the way they are articulated in a series of equivalences through the metaphoric 
surplus which defines the identity of every one of them” (Žižek, 1990: 250). The 
difficulty lies in that “the subject-position is a mode of how we recognize our 
position of an (interested) agent of the social process, of how we experience 
our commitment to a certain ideological cause. But, as soon as we constitute 
ourselves as ideological subjects, as soon as we respond to interpellation and 
assume a certain subject-position, we are a priori, per definitionem deluded, we 
are overlooking the radical dimension of social antagonism, that is to say, the 
traumatic kernel symbolization of which always fails” (Žižek, 1990: 251). Žižek 
is saying that if antagonism is also defined by “the presence of the ‘Other’ [that] 
prevents me from being totally myself”, a possible defeat of that ‘other’ (enemy) 
would lead to an abolition of antagonism and, consequently, my identity would 
be fully constituted and a substantial subject would appear. However, we are 
able to escape from the substantial subject if we consider the following postu-
late: “it is not the external enemy who is preventing me from achieving identity 
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with myself, but every identity is already in itself blocked, marked by an impos-
sibility, and the external enemy is simply the small piece, the rest of reality upon 
which we ‘project’ or ‘externalize’ this intrinsic immanent impossibility” (Žižek, 
1990: 252).
Broadly speaking, we agree with Žižek’s argument. Although, it is important to 
point out that with respect to their concept of hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe 
clarified that even though the idea of hegemonic articulation opens the pos-
sibility of separately specifying the identity of the articulated elements, such 
identities are also precarious because it is impossible to anchor the meaning 
of the elements to an ultimate literality. Therefore, not only an order is open, 
but also the elements comprising the hegemonic chain are open because they 
cannot constitute themselves as full and closed identities. Furthermore, it is im-
portant to note that Laclau and Mouffe consider subject-positions to be tinged 
by the logic of overdetermination, implying that each subject-position is always 
overdetermined by the others. Thus, each subject-position acquires an open 
and incomplete character showing the “politically negotiable character of eve-
ry identity” (Laclau/Mouffe, 1985: 131). Therefore, not only a particular social 
force (a political identity) is conceived as an open identity, but also the elements 
which comprise it are also open elements, with the impossibility of constituting 
themselves as full or closed identities. 
If we are interested in this last definition, this is because it opens the possibil-
ity of interpreting, from Lacan’s perspective, antagonism as an effect of the real 
in the imaginary. This is the first turn in the development of Laclau’s theory – 
shared with Mouffe until this point. Here, Laclau emphasizes the imaginary, i.e. 
he problematizes antagonism in terms of the imaginary. It is worth remembering 
that, for Lacan, the imaginary is defined as the place of the Ego par excellence, 
with its phenomena of illusion governed by the Gestalt laws. The register of the 
imaginary is essentially related to the image, to the representation (insofar as 
what is presented again instead of an absence), to the attempt at the synthesis, 
unification, or closure of meaning.  
Thus, the definition of antagonism as “the presence of the ‘Other’ [that] prevents 
me from being totally myself” implies some manner of inscription of the trau-
matic real, constitutive of every identity. The possibility of establishing a fron-
tier which delimits a ‘self’ and ‘others’ is a way of ‘representing the irrepresent-
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able’. We will consider Laclau and Mouffe’s definition of antagonism by turning 
to Wittgenstein. They define it as a ‘testimony’ of the impossibility because it 
is a relation that shows the limits of all objectivity insofar as “what cannot be 
said can be shown”. And here we focus on the testimony function and the term 
‘showing’. They both definitely belong to the order of the image, that is, strictly 
speaking, to the register of the imaginary.       
At this point, we would like to introduce the metaphor of the mirror that Lacan 
used to understand the constitution of the Ego. Identities can only constitute 
themselves through their relation with the other, with what it is not. Thus in all 
the cases, the configuration of the identity implies the establishment of a differ-
ence, and the success of its affirmation lies in its capacity to exclude the other. 
But at the same time, the identity depends on the definition of the other for its 
constitution. Therefore, a specular relation necessarily expresses an antagonis-
tic relation, insofar as “the presence of the ‘Other’ [that] prevents me from being 
totally myself”. Thus, because of the impossibility of an identity constituting 
itself as closed, I constitute my presence through identification with the other. 
This other who acts as a mirror lets me know of my presence, but at the same 
time, it threatens it.       
Therefore in this mise en scène of the rivalry with the other, antagonism is con-
stitutive of the identity. The latter will distinguish its presence by exclusion, in 
order to differentiate itself from the pure separation of elements. Antagonism 
represents this specular relation leading to the establishment of the identity 
which, in its precariousness, sees itself threatened because its existence de-
pends on the presence of the other.         
Dislocation
From the publication of New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (1990), a 
second turn in Laclau’s theory can be identified. It is characterized by the rad-
icalization of the concept of antagonism and the abandonment of Foucault’s 
notion of subject-positions. In addition, Laclau took into account the above-
mentioned Žižek’s objections and introduced the concept of dislocation (1990), 
i.e. the failure of the structure to close as such. Every identity (and social object) 
is dislocated per se because it depends on an outside that denies it and, at the 
same time, is its condition of possibility. Since the field of identities is relational 
55
the names of the real in laclau’s theory
because the social subjects do not constitute themselves in a purely external 
way (the ones from the others), the identities can never constitute themselves 
fully, but they form a system impossible to become closed, which always de-
pends on the determined outside that constitutes it. 
One of the key ways of considering the specificity of the dislocation concept 
is to conceive it as the source of freedom. In this respect, Laclau points out: 
“Dislocation is the source of freedom. But this is not the freedom of a subject 
with a positive identity – in which case it would just be a structural locus – 
rather it is a freedom of a structural fault which can only construct an identity 
through acts of identification” (Laclau, 1990: 60). From this quotation we may 
deduce two key issues. First of all, the structure is already dislocated and that 
structural gap is considered as a source of freedom because there are no struc-
tural determinations for the subject. For this reason, the structural gap is the 
place of the subject, the moment of decision beyond the structure. Secondly, 
and as a consequence of the previous point, Laclau’s notion of subject acquires 
specificity at this juncture of his work because he abandons Foucault’s idea of 
subject-positions, present in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, and establishes a 
precise differentiation between the notions of subject, identity, and identifica-
tion. Thus, there would be no positive identity; the subject could only have ac-
cess to something similar to identity through identification.  
Dislocation would be, then, the place of the subject in New Reflections on the 
Revolution of Our Time, the place of an absence where the subject equals “the 
pure form of the structure’s dislocation, of its ineradicable distance from itself” 
(Laclau, 1990: 60). As a consequence, and based on Lacanian theoretical tools, 
we may claim – regarding the subject in this second stage of Laclau – that it is no 
longer a matter of subject-positions as imaginary identifications, but a subject 
constituted by the lack. In short, from the arguments involved in the abandon-
ment of the notion of subject positions, the subject of the lack emerges and, as a 
result of the radicalization of the notion of antagonism, the relevance of disloca-
tion comes up. 
What is the difference between antagonism and dislocation, then? The answer 
is found in the words of the author: “The idea of constructing, of living the ex-
perience of dislocation as antagonistic, based on the construction of an enemy, 
already assumes a moment of discursive construction of the dislocation which 
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makes possible its domination, in some way, in a conceptual system which is in 
the base of certain experience […]. Then, in New Reflections on the Revolution of 
Our Time, I attempted to develop a notion of negativity to deepen the moment 
of dislocation, previous to every form of discursive organization, or discursive 
overcoming, or discursive suture of that dislocation” (Laclau, 1997: 126). In the 
previous point, we define antagonism as designing what cannot be said, or as a 
testimony of impossibility. Thus, antagonism is already a way of giving meaning 
to what is impossible to symbolize, and as to showing, it is an imaginary manner 
of inscription of what continues to elude. To define a specular frontier between 
friends and enemies, an antagonistic relation as a limit to objectiveness implies 
doing something with the traumatic kernel inherent in every identity. In the dis-
location concept, instead, we find a radical exclusion between the ‘real’ and the 
‘symbolic’. In this case, dislocation appears deprived of the possibilities opened 
by the symbolic order. Dislocation not only defies its capture by the ‘symbolic’, 
but it keeps itself in an outwardness without law. The dislocation means that it 
cannot be operated with the symbolic on the real.  
To sum up, we identify as the second turn of Laclau’s theory the disjunction 
between the ‘real’ and the ‘symbolic’ which is implied in the notion of dislo-
cation. 
Heterogeneity
In his last book, On Populist Reason (2005), Laclau focuses on an inspiring re-
flection about populism. He introduces a key innovation that determines the 
third turn of his theory: the concept of heterogeneity.
Laclau’s notion of populism refers to ‘people’ as plebs that claim to be the only 
legitimate populus. That is, a partiality (the plebs, the least privileged) that 
wants to function as the totality of the community (the populus, the people as 
the abstract name of such community). Thus, populism appears when a part is 
identified with the whole and there is a radical exclusion within the communi-
tarian space. In other words, in a populist articulation an equivalential relation 
needs to prevail, among a plurality of social demands. It puts into play the figure 
of the ‘people’ and establishes an antagonistic frontier between ‘us, the people’ 
and ‘them, the enemies of the people’. Then, the ‘people’ of populism emerge 
due to the impossibility of every order (objectivity, identity, etc.) to close itself as 
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a completely coherent and unified sameness. The ‘people’ of populism is part of 
the unachievable search for the fulfilment of the community. As a consequence, 
the ‘people’ implies a radical frontier because its own presence is the effect of 
antagonism, constitutive of the social order. So, “without this initial breakdown 
of something in the social order, there is no possibility of antagonism, frontier, 
or, ultimately, people” (Laclau, 2005: 113).
Furthermore, another key issue that Laclau introduces in this stage of his theo-
retical development is the dimension of affect in the figure of the ‘people’. The 
introduction of this dimension means that the basic proposition of Laclau and 
Mouffe, i.e. ‘society is impossible’, gains new scope. That is, the ‘people’ consti-
tute themselves from the ‘impossibility of the society’. How do we understand 
this statement in the third stage of Laclau’s theory? The social order is not pre-
sented as something homogeneous; there is nothing in common among the 
members of the social field because the nature of the subject is the impossibil-
ity of relation. Precisely what constitutes a multiplicity of heterogeneities of a 
community is the impossibility of the social relation: the common ground is the 
impossible, the heterogeneous, the real. If there is an affective tie it is because 
this relation is impossible. In short, as there is no relation, there is an affective 
tie. We will now analyze the affective dimension.  
Laclau incorporates the affective dimension, using as a primary source Freud’s 
book Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego (Freud, 1921). In contrast to the 
Hobbesian theoretic model, the constitution of the people surpasses the figure 
of the leader as a transcendent element which gives meaning to what is rep-
resented, as is shown in Freud’s above-mentioned book (Freud, 1921: 110) and 
reintroduced by Laclau in On Populist Reason (Laclau, 2005). But are we denying 
the notion of transcendence in the argument of Laclau about the people? No, 
but we have to analyze what kind of transcendence Laclau refers to, based on 
psychoanalysis. 
The diagram in Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego presents a formula of 
the constitution of a mass of people with a leader. Freud shows the centrality of 
affect (identification and infatuation) in this articulation, since the identifica-
tion tie, which is established among the members of the mass, is possible due 
to a relation of the idealization of a leader by each member. Freud states that a 
mass that has a leader is “a number of individuals who have substituted one and 
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the same object for their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves 
with one another in their ego. This condition admits graphic representation”:
(Freud, 1921: 109–110)
The text and the graphic show the relations among the elements that are part of 
the articulation. Each of the unbroken parallel lines is one of the members of the 
mass, and in each line, the following instances are represented: the ego ideal, 
the ego, and the object1. At the same time, in the dotted lines the ‘libidinal tie’ is 
observed: among the egos by identification and among the ego ideals by infatu-
ation with the leader. However, these libidinal ties are possible because each 
subject has renounced directly sexual satisfaction in relation to the object of the 
drive since the investiture of an ‘external object’ (it renounces the sensual love 
tendency). Thus, every directly sexual satisfaction is excluded and the subject 
remains tied to the ‘external object’ by drives that are inhibited in their sexual 
aim (the tender emotional trend), referring to the idealization or being in love. 
According to the direction of the arrows in the graphic above, there is a kind of 
logical counterclockwise movement: the satisfaction of the ego is renounced; 
the external object is invested, having taken the place of the ego ideal (idealiza-
tion) and the concomitant identification of the egos as well.
In Freud’s graphic, we can find a kind of knot which expresses the affective 
bonds established in a mass of people. This knot is relevant for our analysis 
because it shows a key element: those small objects which have no bonds con-
necting each other, however, are those that make articulation possible. (Notice 
that in the graphic there is no line of dots traced among them and their centre is 
1 On the symbolic, imaginary, and real character of these instances, see: Biglieri, P. and Per-
elló, G., ed., (2007), and Perelló, G. (2006).
x
Ego Ideal Ego Object
External
object
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empty). These objects – similar to the Lacanian object a – anticipate something 
that can be called ‘transcendence’. So, from a Lacanian perspective, we can as-
sert that this transcendence is not ontological. Or, speaking specifically about 
ontology, we should say the ontology of the ‘real’. 
What does the ontology of the real mean? To understand the manner in which 
‘reality’ is instituted, as well as its foundations and meanings – problems that 
belong to the field of ontology, we reintroduce Lacan’s reference to the “uncon-
scious cause” that appears in Seminar XI. There, Lacan states that every effect is 
submitted to the pressure of a “causal order” as long as it is a “lost cause”, i.e. a 
cause inherently an empty space. In other words, that the unconscious cause is 
inherently an empty space means that it is neither a being nor a non-being. This 
unconscious cause is defined as an interdiction. Lacan says in a cryptic way, 
“the prohibition that brings to being an existant” (Lacan, 1979: 128). According 
to Miller2, to put into play a negative entity, a nothing that, however, is not noth-
ing, that is like a call to being, introduces a rupture in the plane of immanence. 
This rupture is a determining factor for the emergence of the Lacanian subject. 
With respect to any plane of immanence – real, vital, or merely in terms of what 
is given – putting into play that negative entity opens a transcendent distance, 
the possibility to go beyond (in reference to Freud’s notion of “beyond the pleas-
ure principle”). In other words, it is what elsewhere Miller called Lacan’s struc-
ture with a beyond: there is a beyond of everything that is given. In addition, 
this concept introduces what Miller names a “transfactual dimension”, which is 
essential in Lacan (Miller, 2006: 213). 
In view of this we could, we claim that the subject in Laclau is a headless sub-
ject3. Precisely because transcendence, as is observed in Freud’s graphic and in 
2 “The setting in motion of such a negative entity – a nothing, yet a nothing that is not precisely 
nothing, that is a kind of call to being – introduces in fact (while determining the birth of the 
Lacanian subject and the destruction of the Hartmannian ego in psychoanalysis) a decisive 
break at the plane of immanence (expression taken from Deleuze) whether it is real, biologi-
cal, natural, or merely given. With respect to every real, vital entity, to set into motion such a 
negative entity opens a transcendent distance, a beyond. It is even the principle that last year 
or two years ago I called in Lacan the structure with a beyond; there is a beyond of everything 
that is given. And this introduces what I called a transfactual dimension – essential in Lacan” 
(Miller, 2006: 213).
3 The notion of a headless subject is taken from Lacan (2003:188), referring to the way of ex-
pressing the drive, because the drive is articulated in terms of tension, outlining the edges in a 
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Laclau’s work, is not located in the place of the leader; instead, it is placed in a 
beyond, in a foundation that is not (exactly) a foundation. As a consequence, we 
can speak of a ‘headless subject’ to illustrate Laclau’s figure of the people. 
Thus, we hold the figure of a ‘headless subject’ because, from our perspective, 
Laclau’s great finding in On Populist Reason (2005) is that, when analyzing the 
problems of populism, he specifies the notion of heterogeneity. The author man-
ages to circumscribe this notion, distinguishing it from the concept of antago-
nism, and taking it beyond the idea of dislocation. The heterogeneity is defined 
by the detour of the people and ends at the centre of his theoretical proposal: 
“the brake involved in this kind of exclusion is more radical than the one that is 
inherent in the antagonistic one: while antagonism still presupposes some sort 
of discursive inscription, the kind of exteriority we are referring to now presup-
poses not only an exteriority to something within a space of representation, but 
to the space of representation as such. I will call this type of exteriority social 
heterogeneity” (Laclau, 2005: 176). 
The antagonism that underlies discourse already assumes some form of inscrip-
tion, as contingent, but at the same time necessary, for the construction of the 
system. The heterogeneous, instead, is not inscribed; it is the real as a waste 
product from the process of signification. That is to say, from now on we are 
considering the real not only in its relation to antagonism, but mainly to the 
heterogeneous or, in psychoanalytic terms, as a surplus-jouissance. The hetero-
geneous is not placed in the ‘inside’ or the ‘outside’. It is placed at a point of 
extimacy. Using this neologism, Lacan means that the most intimate is located 
on the outside and announces its presence as a strange body that recognizes a 
constitutive rupture of the intimacy (Miller, 1987). 
It is in this sense that the ‘people’ in Laclau can be considered as a structure 
with a beyond. The transcendence is not located in the place of the leader; it 
is located beyond it, in the nothing that, however, is not nothing. For that rea-
son, we claim that the figure that corresponds to ‘people’, as it is presented by 
Laclau, is that of the ‘headless subject’, as far as it is anchored in an empty 
transcendence. To use Laclau’s terminology, the place of the transcendence is 
topology where what is produced in the course of the drive is a circuit around an absence.  
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heterogeneity, not only a radical difference. More precisely and to use psycho-
analytic concepts, heterogeneity refers to surplus-jouissance.
In conclusion, in this third turn of Laclau’s theorization, we understand the het-
erogeneity as a real not only in its dimension of a lack in the symbolic order – as 
could be conceived in the dislocation notion – but in its dimension of pleasure. 
Corollary
We have analyzed Laclau’s work from a perspective that introduces elements 
of psychoanalysis and determined three stages: a first stage that corresponds 
to the centrality of the concept of antagonism, which represents the solution of 
the imaginary order to the impossibility of society, and in this respect, as the im-
aginarization of the real that prevents and makes possible the systematicity of 
the signification system. In the second stage, Laclau’s theory is organized from 
his idea of dislocation as an expression of the disjunction between the symbolic 
and the real, as the constitutive impossibility of the symbolic to deal with the 
real. And finally, the third stage is characterized by the concept of heterogene-
ity, as the surplus-jouissance. Heterogeneity emerges as a waste product of the 
reason that supports the configuration of the ‘people’, involving the affective 
dimension; like a lost cause that drives the social knotting.  
The progressive idea of thinking of these three concepts as evolutionary stages 
of a theoretical development may emerge as a reflective temptation. However, 
we claim that these three elements should not be considered as one surpassing 
the other, i.e. as dislocation surpassing antagonism and heterogeneity surpass-
ing dislocation. Instead, these three concepts together should be placed in the 
same theoretical field, because all of them arise as a consequence of Laclau hav-
ing dealt with different problems throughout his work. Each of these concepts is 
useful for considering different problematics. For example, antagonism is use-
ful for thinking about the specular other, not as the different or the Other, but 
in terms of the constitution of self, i.e. allowing the construction of a certain 
identity, at least, by identification. The concept of dislocation, by contrast, is 
useful? Insofar as it shows the limits of the symbolic order in dealing with the 
real. Thus, the deficiencies of what is instituted to solve a lack impossible to 
articulate can be evidenced. In fact, dislocation questions the blind confidence 
in the institutional possibility of overcoming the obstacles and romantic pro-
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posals of consensus. Finally, heterogeneity can help us reflect upon subjective 
responsibility, according to Lacan’s notion of ‘lost cause’, highlighting this time 
the double meaning of cause: as a cause that should be defended, and as what 
causes, as a foundation. On the one hand, the lost cause is a failed cause be-
cause, in the best of cases, it never fulfils itself completely. On the other hand, 
it is a lost cause because, in contrast to what academic knowledge teaches us, 
“if the cause is taken away, its effect will disappear” (Ablata causa tollitur ef-
fectus). For Laclau, the effects appear in the absence of the cause. These two 
meanings of ‘lost cause’ imply that there is no certainty regarding the starting 
points or destinies because there are no ultimate foundations to start from and 
give meaning. In line with this concept, there are no final aims established a 
priori which can be achieved in a complete (and finished) way. Therefore, such 
‘lost cause’, as a function of the impossible, does not involve powerlessness, 
paralysis, or resignation. It implies “an experience that intends to transform the 
absent foundation into cause” (Alemán, 2009: 14), that is to say, it implies an 
ethical position because, when considering the ‘lost cause’, “there will always 
be something missing or excessive. In short, there will always be a real insist-
ing on not being inscribed” (Lacan, 1988: 82). And this absence of certainties 
evokes a call to become involved in political struggles and to adopt an ethical 
posture. So the call to political militancy can be linked to the fact that we do not 
have anything guaranteed in advance, we do not know how events will develop 
and, as it is not possible to establish the path towards a reconciled society in a 
transparent and certain way – in addition to society always being impossible, 
we do not know to where this incessant irruption of the real into the symbolic-
imaginary order may lead us; and finally, this call to militancy lies in the inextri-
cable nature of heterogeneity.   
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